We investigate the physical layer security of a wireless cooperative network where communication between Alice and Bob is assisted by a full-duplex (FD) untrusted relay, Ray, in the presence of multiple external eavesdroppers, Eves. A cluster-based colluding eavesdropping setting is considered, where illegitimate nodes with common interests are grouped in a cluster. To confuse the different eavesdropping clusters, we employ artificial-noise (AN) aided beamforming at the source node. Moreover, FD relay jamming is used to improve the system's security. To maintain secure communications against the untrusted relay node, an FD destination jamming scheme is adopted. Our proposed scheme is designed based on the channel state information of the legitimate nodes only. We optimize the transmit power allocation factors between data and AN signals, the data and AN precoders at Alice, the AN precoder at Bob, and the data and AN precoders at Ray. Numerical results show that the optimal power allocation factor between data and AN depends on the total number of antennas of the different colluding eavesdropping clusters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eavesdropping on network traffic is one of the most critical security attacks due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Security techniques have traditionally been implemented at the higher layers of communication networks based on cryptography. To meet confidentiality requirements in complex and diverse scenarios, there has been a renewed interest in a multilayer wireless security solution that exploits the time-varying nature of wireless channels at the physical layer, known as physical layer security (PLS), with cryptography protocols implemented at the application layer.
As proven in [1] , a positive secrecy capacity is achieved only when the rate of the source-eavesdropper channel is worse than the rate of the source-destination channel. When the transmitter has multiple antennas, a widely used secrecy approach aims at reducing the eavesdropper's signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) by sending an artificial noise (AN) signal, superimposed on the data signal, into the null space of the intended receiver's channel matrix [2] , [3] to ensure that only the eavesdropper's received signal will be degraded.
For the single-antenna source scenario, by using cooperative jamming (CJ) techniques [4] , [5] , the helper nodes cooperatively inject AN signals independent of the confidential information signals to jam the eavesdropping nodes. Referred to as the destination-based jamming (DBJ) technique, the destination can perform CJ to degrade the channel quality of an internal eavesdropper, such as an untrusted relay [6] . In fact, the relay nodes can be honest but curious nodes, hence, they are trusted at the service level but are untrusted at the information level. The authors of [7] proposed a joint DBJ and CJ scheme to reduce the secrecy outage probability of wireless cooperative systems under untrusted half-duplex relaying.
The common theme of the aforementioned works is based on the fact that they mainly employ the half-duplex (HD) mode at the relay, due to its low complexity. Recent progress in self-interference cancellation techniques has enabled full-duplex (FD) relaying as a promising spectral efficient solution [8] . To improve the PLS, a hybrid HD/FD relay-selection technique was proposed in [9] . Recently, FD-relaying with jamming was proposed to assist a single-antenna source in improving the system's secrecy capacity [10] . In fact, in this approach, the FD relay is designed to transmit a jamming signal to the eavesdropper while receiving the data from the source. To achieve a positive secrecy capacity, the authors of [11] assumed an FD legitimate receiver that simultaneously receives its intended data and sends jamming signals to an FD untrusted relay.
Generally, most PLS schemes are proposed against attacks by either an individual eavesdropper or independently operating multiple eavesdroppers (i.e., noncolluding eavesdroppers). However, the subscribed users in a network (each with an arbitrary number of antennas) can construct collaborative eavesdropping clusters based on common interests (benefits) and operate in parallel as illegitimate nodes. In other words, there are many attacking systems and each one has its own nodes that work for its benefit. In this case, the noncolluding eavesdropping model may underestimate the adversary's power and fail to capture it. For an ideal attack strategy, when multiple eavesdroppers coexist, they may share their signal observations to make the eavesdropping attack more efficient (i.e., colluding eavesdroppers). Furthermore, for collaboration purposes, eavesdroppers can be classified by the type of their attacks, their geographic locations, or any beneficial incentives.
To the best of our knowledge, the cluster-based colluding eavesdropping model has not been studied in the literature before. In addition, we investigate the secrecy performance of the untrusted FD relay network in the presence of multiple external clusters of eavesdroppers. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We consider a generalized case of eavesdropping attacks and assume that multiple external eavesdropping nodes coexist with the FD untrusted relay. Furthermore, we assume that these eavesdropping nodes are organized into clusters and that attackers within the same cluster collude with each other to design a joint attack. 2) To achieve positive secrecy, we propose a new scheme to secure the source transmissions and derive the achievable secrecy rate. In our proposed scheme, the destination operates in the FD mode to receive its intended data signal while jamming the untrusted relay. On the other hand, the multiantenna nodes, the source 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider secure communication between a transmitter (Alice) and an FD receiver (Bob) through an FD amplify-and-forward (AF) untrusted relay node (Ray), in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Alice (A), Bob (B), and Ray (R) are assumed to be equipped with one receive and multiple transmit antennas, which can be the typical case for the low-complexity receivers that are equipped with low number of receive radio-frequency (RF) chains. 1 We denote the number of transmit antennas at node j as N j where j ∈ {A, R, B}. We assume that the multiple alien/external eavesdroppers are located in the radio-frequency (RF) range of Alice, Bob, and Ray. As shown in Fig. 1 , we further assume that, according to their interdependent behaviors, the eavesdroppers are divided into M different clusters/groups, (G i , 1 ≤ i ≤ M ). Eavesdroppers within the same cluster can jointly process their received information signals, which makes the security issue more challenging. We denote the total number of eavesdroppers' antennas in cluster G i as N e i . We assume that the legitimate nodes do not have knowledge of the eavesdroppers' channel state information (CSI), This assumption is reasonable since the eavesdroppers are passive nodes that try to access information of the legitimate nodes. The legitimate transmitters know the CSI of their own links to their respective receivers.
Alice transmits her information signal, x, to Bob through the FD relay. At the same time, Bob sends an AN signal, denoted by z B , to confuse Ray so that he is not able to decode Alice's data. The jamming signal from Bob, which is also embedded in Ray's forwarded signal, will only hurt the eavesdroppers. When Ray forwards the signal to Bob, the AN can be canceled out. This will secure the transmissions from both alien eavesdropping and from the untrusted relay. All the eavesdroppers are able to hear all transmissions. To secure her transmissions, Alice assigns a portion of her power, θ A , for data and the rest, θ A , to send an AN signal denoted by z A . The AN signal from Alice 1 We emphasize that the proposed ideas can be extended to the multiantenna receivers. A simple extension can be for the case of receive antenna selection schemes.
is designed to be canceled at Ray to avoid forwarding the interference signal to Bob. Furthermore, Ray uses a part of his own power to send an AN signal, denoted by z R , orthogonal to the Ray-Bob channel vector. This AN signal will only jam the alien eavesdroppers. The data power ratio at R is denoted by θ R .
Time is partitioned into slots each with a duration of T . The channel has a bandwidth of W. We assume a block-fading channel model where each codeword experiences many channel realizations. The channel coefficients remain constant during a time slot (coherence time) duration, but change independently from one time slot duration to another. We assume that h ij ∈ C 1 ×N i denotes the channel vector between node i, (i ∈ {A, B, R}), and node j, (j ∈ {B, R}). The channel matrix between node i and the multiple colluding eavesdroppers within cluster G j is denoted by G j i ∈ C III. SECRECY RATE OF PROPOSED SCHEME According to the described scheme, the transmit vectors by Alice and Bob are given by
is designed at Bob to be orthogonal to his selfinterference channel vector, i.e., h B B B A N = 0 1 ×(N B −1) . Thus, the received signal at Ray is given by
where n R ∈ C is the AWGN signal at Ray's receiver. To maximize the SINR at Ray, the precoding vector a in f should be equal to h * A R h A R . Simultaneously, Ray transmits the following signal to Bob
where w R ∈ C N R ×1 is the transmit precoder vector used at Ray, and
which nulls the self-interference at Ray and Bob. Thus, h R B W A N = 0 1 ×(N R −2) and h R R W A N = 0 1 ×(N R −2) . To avoid system instability, where all the previously transmitted data symbols are amplified and forwarded over time, we have to set h R R w R = 0. Consequently, we assume zero-forcing processing for the signal transmitted by Ray at his own receiver. Under this assumption, the precoding vector w R is designed to maximize the power received at Bob, while canceling out the self-interference at Ray. Applying some linear algebra, w R can be computed by solving the following optimization problem:
and is given by
Then, (3) can be written as
Therefore, the received signal at Bob is given by
Hence, the achievable rate of the legitimate system is given by
where P A and P R are the transmit powers at Alice and Ray, respectively. Moreover, Ray's interception rate is given by
Each alien eavesdropper receives two versions of the same symbol but shifted by one time symbol processing delay (due to delay in processing at Ray). Hence, after exchanging and combining information signals, the received signal at the eavesdroppers in cluster G i is given by
where n E i is the AWGN signal vector at the eavesdroppers belonging to G i . For better data interception, each cluster of eavesdroppers needs to rearrange the received signals and decode the entire signal as a single block. Specifically, the received signal at the colluding eavesdroppers in G i is , z B (B) ]. The signal vector in (10) can be rewritten as
where D, C A , C R , and C B are given in (12) at the top of the next page. Based on (7), (8) , and (13), the instantaneous secrecy rate for the proposed scheme is given by
We assume that Ray and the different clusters of eavesdroppers process their received signals independently and only eavesdroppers in the same cluster collude (i.e., jointly process their received signals). Since the channel is block fading and legitimate nodes do not know the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropping links, the system's security is given by the average secrecy rate η(θ A , θ R ) = E{R sec }, which can be easily obtained numerically through Monte Carlo methods. After obtaining the optimal precoding and filtering matrices based on the CSI of the legitimate links, the only two remaining parameters that we possibly optimize to maximize the average secrecy rate are 0 ≤ θ A ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ R ≤ 1. This average secrecy rate is defined as the number of securely decoded bits at Bob per second per hertz. The constrained optimization problem is stated as follows: max :
Remark 1: The optimization problem in (15) is solved at a predetermined trusted control unit then the parameters will be announced to all the other nodes. To solve (15), the control unit needs the statistics of eavesdropping links only. The solution is obtained offline using the interior-point methods, or a 2-dimensional grid-based search over the optimization variables 0 ≤ θ A ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ R ≤ 1. If the control unit decides to use the grid-based search, it divides the range of each variable, which is from 0 to 1 in our case, into L points then computes the objective function L 2 times and selects the pair (θ A , θ R ) that has the highest objective function η(θ A , θ R ). We note here that the optimization problem solution depends on the average system's parameters and not their instantaneous values. Hence, the complexity in obtaining the solution is relatively low and the solution of (15) is used throughout the network lifetime and as long as the system parameters' statistics remain unchanged.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to evaluate the achieved average secrecy rate of our proposed scheme in a Rayleigh fading environment where the channel coefficients are circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. We set the transmit powers of Alice, Bob, and Ray to P A = P B = P R = 10 dBm. The AWGN power at any receiving node is normalized to 0 dBm. We assume that each transmission block is associated with a normalized time slot of duration T = 10 ms and bandwidth W = 1 MHz. The number of transmit antennas at Alice, Bob, and Ray are N A = N B = N R = 4. We assume that multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers are grouped into one cluster. Then, the total number of antennas, denoted by N E , in the cluster is equal to the number of its nodes. The DBJ scheme is represented by the case of θ A = θ R = 1 (i.e., Alice and Ray allocate their powers to data transmissions). Hence, it cannot outperform our proposed scheme. Figs. 2 and 3 show the average secrecy rate of our proposed scheme versus the data power allocation factors, θ A and θ R , at Alice and Ray, respectively, for different total numbers of receive antennas, N E , of the eavesdropping cluster. We assumed: N E = 4 and N E = 2. In both scenarios, for fixed θ A and θ R , as N E increases, the average secrecy rate decreases. Obviously, the eavesdropping cluster's ability to decode the information increases with its total number of antennas.
It is also clear that a dynamic power allocation increases the average secrecy rate of our proposed scheme. As shown in Fig. 3 , the optimal values of θ A and θ R are close to one. The reason is that when N E is small, the eavesdropping nodes, even with collusion, do not have enough ability to decode the received signals that are combined with Bob's jamming signal. In this case, the untrusted relay with a single receive antenna will be more powerful to eavesdrop the data signal. Hence, in such cases, Bob's jamming signal is sufficient to achieve secure transmission and Alice and Ray should allocate more power to transmit data signals to increase Bob's achievable rate.
However in Fig. 2 , when N E = 4, the eavesdropping cluster is more powerful than the untrusted relay and becomes a threat to secure transmission. Thus, the eavesdropping SINR dominates in the secrecy rate expression. Therefore, Alice and Ray should carefully use some of their available transmit powers to send jamming signals. As shown in Fig. 2 , the optimal values of θ A and θ R are between 40% and 75% and between 80% and 100%, respectively. Furthermore, we can see that Alice should expend more jamming power than the untrusted relay. In fact, the noise signal and Bob's jamming signal are amplified at Ray. Hence, when θ R increases, the jamming noise at the eavesdropping cluster increases while Bob's rate increases as well. On the other hand, along with DBJ, transmitting AN from Alice, i.e., θ A = 1, is needed to protect her own transmissions.
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the PLS of FD untrusted relay networks in the presence of multiple external clusters of colluding eavesdroppers. We proposed an AN-aided secure transmission scheme in which the untrusted relay and the destination cooperate with the source to confound the eavesdroppers and the relay, respectively, by generating AN signals. Our numerical results quantified the average secrecy rate gains of the AN and the negative impact of increasing the total number of antennas of the eavesdroppers clusters. We showed that the optimal values of the power factor at Alice, θ A , and the power factor at the relay, θ R , are between 40% and 75% and between 80% and 100%, respectively. When the total number of receive antennas in the eavesdropping clusters is small, almost all the power should be allocated to the information signal at both the source and the relay. However, more jamming power is required as the number of the eavesdropping cluster's antennas increases.
